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I. INTRODUCTION

Democracy is increasingly the sine quo non of legitimate governance
at the local, provincial and national levels. As power increasingly transfers
to the international system, a decent collective future for humankind is
likely to hinge on the extent to which we can integrate the values of
democracy into the global system. If a more than cosmetic democratization
of the global order is to occur, some institution or institutions representing
citizens directly will need to take a prominent place within it.
Different people will have different ideas about how this can be done,
and I do not wish to suggest that there is only one way parliamentary
processes can be institutionalized at the global level.' But to make today's
discussion concrete, and to encourage further dialogue, I will first present
the proposal for a global democratic organization that Richard Falk and I
have been promoting.2 I will then discuss why I believe some initiative
along the lines we are suggesting is important to our collective future.
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1.
For example I compare four different approaches to initiating a global parliament in
Andrew Strauss, On the FirstBranch of Global Governance, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 347 (2007).
2.
For some of our representative works see, e.g., Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, Toward
Global Parliament,80 FOREIGN AFF. 212 (Jan./Feb. 2001); Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, On the
Creation of a Global PeoplesAssembly: Legitimacy and the Power of PopularSovereignty, 36 STAN J.
INT'L L. 191 (2000); Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, The Deeper Challenges of Global Terrorism, A
Democratizing Response, in DEBATING COSMOPOLITICS, (Archibugi, Ed., 2003).
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II. THE PROPOSAL FOR A GLOBAL PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

Richard Falk and I have been arguing that it is time to respond to the
crisis of democratic legitimacy with the creation of a Global Parliamentary
Assembly (GPA), a popularly elected world parliamentary body modeled
on the European Parliament. The key to this proposal for a global
parliament is that it is potentially transformative of the global system, while
at the same time being politically realistic. It is potentially transformative
in that its ultimate goal is a universally elected world body with limited but
important legislative powers.' It is politically realistic in that it prescribes a
process of incremental steps for bringing this vision to fruition. We
propose that a stand-alone treaty agreed to by a vanguard of progressive
democratic countries constitute the GPA.4 We have suggested that even as
few as twenty geographically, and economically diverse countries could be
enough to found the GPA.' At the beginning, so as not to be too
threatening to existing national leaders, the GPA's powers could be largely
precatory. A civil society campaign could help create a political climate
conducive to the successful conclusion of such a treaty.6 The hope would
be that the success of the kinds of initiatives best exemplified by the
creation of the International Criminal Court could be repeated.
One lesson of the last half of the twentieth century is that Promethean
plans to instantly transform global governance are exceedingly difficult to
realize. What has proved successful, however, is the incrementalism that
culminated in the European Union. Though the future cannot be predicted,
once in place a GPA would be poised to grow in influence. Citizen
elections would give it a unique visibility, and as the only global institution
with a popular mandate, citizen groups would likely petition the parliament
to pass resolutions supporting their causes. Those opposed, be they
industrial lobbies, states, or other citizen groups would be unlikely to
willingly cede the parliament's popular legitimacy to their policy
opponents. Instead, playing out the familiar process of parliamentary
politics, they would likely participate as well. The parliament's arena could
3.
The scope of the GPA's ultimate powers would, of course, be the subject of wide ranging
negotiations involving multiple stake holders over an extended period of time. There is, however, likely
to be strong consensus on two limitations to the GPA's powers as fundamental to its status as a globally
democratic body. The first is that its prerogatives be limited by the human rights protections enshrined
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other similar human rights instruments. The second
is that the GPA's powers be limited by the principle of subsidiary, that it should only legislate in areas
that are appropriately in the international, as opposed to the domestic, sphere.
4.

Toward Global Parliament, supranote 2, at 219.

5.

Id.

6.
See Campaign for the Establishment of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly,
http://en.unpacampaign.orglappeal/support/mps _ailO.php (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
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grow as a much needed venue where the various global interests could
directly interact to promote their positions and resolve differences without
having to rely on their respective governments to be intermediaries.
Once the GPA is established, citizen groups from countries all over the
world could petition their governments to join, and once a critical mass of
membership is reached even authoritarian governments would find it
politically costly to deny their citizens the right to be represented through
free and fair elections in the one globally democratic institution. At some
point in its evolution the Parliament's formal legal powers, as well as its
relationship with the United Nations, would have to be settled. Perhaps it
could, along with the General Assembly, be a part of a bicameral global
legislative system.
III. THE CASE FOR A GLOBAL PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

A. Democracy
The international system is not organized along democratic lines.
Most significantly, it does not provide citizens, or even states, an equal
democratic right to participate in the political process. The UN Security
Council, for example, does not allow meaningful citizen participation, and
it only includes representatives from fifteen countries. 7 As is well known,
even delegates from most of those fifteen countries are not fully
enfranchised as the Security Council's five permanent members can
unilaterally veto non procedural resolutions.8 Even organizations that are
ostensibly more democratic such as the World Trade Organization, where
voting is based on member consensus, 9 are in truth largely controlled by the
dictates of a few dominant members.' 0 As the demands of globalization
increasingly transfer power from many relatively democratic national
systems to the undemocratic international system, the future of democracy
may depend upon the international system being democratized.
A GPA would introduce democratic equality into the global system. If
democratically constituted, it would grant citizens a substantially equal
voice in choosing their representatives, and all citizens would have access
to the parliament's processes. In addition a GPA would further the goal of
7.

U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 1.

8.

Id. art 27, para. 3.

See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. IX, para. 1, 33
9.
I.L.M. 1140 (1994).
See Sonia E. Rolland, Developing Country Coalitions at the WTO: In Search of Legal
10.
Support, 48 HARv. IWTL L.J. 483, 525-530 (2007) (discussing the practice of "Green Room" decisionmaking whereby important decisions are made outside of formal processes by the most influential
countries).
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making international organizations democratically accountable to the global
citizenry. While the powers of the GPA would grow gradually, even from
its inception, it could play a positive advisory role in democratically
overseeing the global system by holding hearings, issuing reports, and
passing resolutions. To have the Director General of the World Trade
Organization, for example, appear before the only popularly elected global
body to answer to citizen representatives would introduce some popular
accountability into the system.
B. Effective Global Governance
The undemocratic international system is often unable to enforce law
on states. This means that it cannot effectively act to protect vital
community interests, such as in the control and elimination of weapons, the
preservation of the earth's biosphere, and the protection of fundamental
human rights.
The problem is that to maximize their autonomy,
governments have erected a global system where with limited exceptions a
state is bound only by laws it agrees to, and even once bound, states often
flaunt those laws they find disagreeable or inconvenient."
Unlike the United Nations, in the GPA delegates would be elected by
citizens rather than appointed by states. Because national capitals would
not control citizen elected representatives, they would be unlikely to favor
states maintaining their autonomy not to comply with international law. To
the contrary, the institutional interests of GPA delegates would be in
expanding that organization's powers. Over time they would, therefore,
likely push for democratically approved international laws to be collectively
binding on states and, even more importantly, on citizens directly. If
citizens, loyal to an assembly elected by them, and that allowed for their
lobbying and other participation, began to answer the call to directly follow

!1.
The two primary sources of international law are treaties and customary international law.
States maintain that they are only bound by treaties to which they agree to become party. States,
likewise, generally maintain that they are not bound to general customary international law if they object
to the custom at the time of its formation (the persistent objector rule). See Luigi Condorelli, Custom, in
International Law: Achievements and Prospects 179, 205 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991). Because
states can seldom demonstrate that they manifested this lack of consent, customary international law is
not completely consensual. See generally J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International
Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 449 (2000). In addition, most states accept that states cannot opt out of a certain
limited class of international jus cogens norms that are so fundamental to international society's core
values as to be non-derigible. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art.
53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 334 (1969) (providing that a treaty is "void if... it conflicts with a peremptory
norm of general international law"). Peremptory norms are probably inclusive of core human rights
standards. See Lauri Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (jus cogens) in International Law: Historical
Development, Criteria, Present Status, Part 111(1988).
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democratically inspired international law, governments would lose the
requisite influence over those they rely upon to defy international law.
C. War and the Preventionof Terrorism
In the age of weapons of mass destruction, the most dangerous
deficiency of the global system is its propensity for political violence. A
global parliament would provide a democratic substitute to achieving
national security through domination and violence. In a global parliament
there would be no unified states to counter, contain, or even attack other
states. Rather, as occurs in other multinational parliaments, such as in
India, Canada or in the European Parliament, delegates would likely break
national ranks to vote along lines of interest and ideology.12 Thus, fluid
transnational parliamentary coalitions could begin to supplant conflict,
including armed conflict, among states. If parliamentary decision-making
proved itself successful, it is possible to imagine over time a genuine
lessening of global tensions, and perhaps, if citizens gradually gained
confidence in global democratic processes, meaningful disarmament.
Likewise, the GPA would offer disaffected citizens an alternative to
terrorism and other forms of political violence. Those impassioned about
perceived injustices would be less likely to feel forced to choose between
surrender and resort to desperate tactics. Citizens would be able to stand for
office, champion candidates, and form coalitions to lobby the parliament.
Those with diverse or opposing views would be brought into a give-andtake setting that would improve the chances for compromise and
reconciliation. When compromise is not possible, even those whose views
do not prevail would more likely accept defeat out of a belief in the fairness
of the process, and a knowledge that they could continue to press their
cause on future occasions.
In particular, a Global Parliamentary Assembly would directly counter
the attraction of antidemocratic extremists such as Al Qaeda. One
important feature of a liberal parliamentary process is its capacity to
assimilate even those who do not share a pre-existing commitment to
democracy. Because parliaments invite participation and have the ability to
confer popular legitimacy on a policy position, experience suggests that
even those with extreme agendas will often be drawn into the parliamentary
process. Of course, the Osama bin Ladens of the planet will never accept
the legitimacy of a global parliament. But their ability to attract a

12.
For an examination of transnational voting in the European Parliament, see generally
Arnie Kreppel, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND SUPRANATIONAL PARTY SYSTEM: A STUDY IN
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (2002).
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significant following would be diminished by the vitality of such an
institution.
IV. CONCLUSION

In making today's case for a GPA, I have argued that such an
institution is both feasible and highly desirable. Of course, the constraints
of a conference where global democracy is only one among many topics has
required that my presentation be at the most general level of abstraction.
Many more questions at the threshold between feasibility and desirability
must be satisfactorily answered for such a project to proceed to fruition.
For example, what voting method or methods for selecting
parliamentarians should be adopted, and in this connection how would
voting districts be determined? Likewise, how would a GPA ensure that the
elections to select its membership are both free and fair? What rules of
campaign finance would be appropriate and workable for a globally elected
body?
In addition, how would the parliament be organized internally? What
would be the role of political parties, and what systems would have to be
put in place to ensure that the parliament's business was appropriately
translated so both parliamentarians and citizens from all over the world
could fully participate in the organization's business?
As important as it is that these matters be appropriately considered by
scholars and those who wish to participate in building a GPA project, they
are of the nature of the questions that all democratic polities must face and
should not obscure the twin core realities that it has been my purpose to
convey today: The global system is deficient in that it is undemocratic,
ineffective, and prone toward political violence, and a global democratic
vision, practically and incrementally pursued, could make an important
contribution toward overcoming these deficiencies.

